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onetime enemies. Paraphrasing the remark of a famous Englishman,
-having met disaster like men, may we meet success like gentlemen.

FOUNDATIONS OF THE CONFLICT BETWEEN
,JAPAN AND THE UNITED NATIONS
D. VI/EIGLis
Carleton College

R.rcHARD

In an address before the American Historical Association in 1940.
Dr. Hu Shih, Chinese Ambassador to the United States, advanced
the l;ypothesis that Japan had adopted the externals of western
material civilization, while maintaining unchanged the essential
core of her ancient culture. Japanese thought and behavior patterns still follow the established traditions, and the Japanese in
the privacy of his home is a totally different person from the Japanese business man· in his office or shop, for example. W esternization, then, has penetrated to no real depth the life of the Japanese
nation.
Dr. Ru's observation suggests an interesting approach to the
problem of the basic conflict between Japan and the United Nations
which burst into open warfare with the attack on Pearl Harbor
December 7, 1941. The question which it raises is whether Japan
on the one hand and the United Nations on the other had yet
reached the point where they sufficiently understood the psychological functionings, the thought processes, and the motivating ideas of
each other. It will be the thesis of this brief paper that the present
conflict is a result, in part at least, of this divergence in cultures;
and also of two other basic issues - the matter of race superiority
and inferiority, and the clash of vital national policies.
The intangible divergence in mental processes is well illustrated
by the f91lowing quotation from the .Tapan times weekly for October rn, 1939:
At the outbreak of the China affair, Japan tried to present her
case before the world in a simple and straight-forward manner. Yet,
some of the Powers not only refused to listen, denouncing whatever ·
Japan stated as "propaganda" in its sinister aspects and shoving it
aside, but obligingly went to the extent of hurling slanderous· remarks and insulting comments. Japan remai_ned stoically silent in
the face of this calumny, certain in belief that those Powers would
realize their own folly sooner or later.

Such protestations of injured self-righteousness are utterly incomprehensible to the western mind. This and other Japanese statements seem so completely at variance with the logic of the facts
that the western reader is amused at Japanese duplicity and naivete.
One writer,.however, answers that to the Japanese this is not pre-
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tense. Miss Barbara Wertheim, writing in Foreign affairs for April,
1936, declares that "appearances mean more than reality to the
Japanese mind" and that the Japanese can make statements "knowing they present a false picture, yet sincerely believing them." 1
This same imponderable quality is hinted at by Tatsuji Takeuchi, eminent professor of international relations at Kwansei Gakuin in Kobe and author of War and diplomacy in the Japanese Empire. In an article in Amerasia for June, 1938, Takeuchi alludes tc
a certain "dualism of Japanese mentality," which he alleges to bE
largely responsible for Japan's failure to obtain a more friendly
hearing abroad. He says that such terms and ideologies as "we arE
fighting in China because we love the Chinese" or "we want to
establish permanent peace in the Orient" convey "a definite meaning when addressed to the Japanese but may evoke totally different
responses to those hoped for from Americans." 2 Such thought processes are quite foreign and incomprehensible to the western •mind
and serve but to create suspicion and mistrust.
Other elements too-raise doubts among the peoples of the west
as to whether Japan should be received wholeheartedly into the society of western nations. The Japanese claim to direct descent from
the sun goddess and their worship of the emperor strike the western
mind as somewhat queer. When this same worship produces such
fanaticism that fighting men become human bombs with total disregard for human life, the effect is rather sobering. Moreover, the
treatment of prisoners in the China war, and the sack and rape of
Nanking created doubts as to the humanity and degree of real civilization among the Japanese. Even the assiduous courtesy in Japan,
with all its elaborate forms, frequently strikes the visitor from _the
Occident as strained and unnatural.
But the difficulty .of understanding is not a:11 on one side. Many
of the usages of modern diplomatic intercourse and many of the
rules of western warfare seem strange and unnecessary when judged
by traditional Japanese standards. The concept of compromise in
negotiation, for example, is foreign to the Japanese. To him negotiation means the attempt of each party to secure the complete acceptance of his desiderata by the other. The Japanese hears much
of the so-called "Christian" nations and wonders as to their sincerity when practice seems such a far cry from theory. He sees no
logic in the contemporary.opposition of western nations to imperialism when Britain. the United States, and the Netherlands have all
acquired stakes of the world's riches in the recent past. He asks ,vhy
the rules of the game should be changed just because Japan was a
late-comer on the imperial scene. The west seems most inconsistent.
The evidence, then seems to indicate a mutual failure to understand
1
·Wertheim, Barbara, "Japan: a clinical note," Foreign affairs, XIV (April, 1936),
520-522.
2
Takeuchi, Tatsuji, "The background of the Sino-Japanese crisis," Amerasia, II
(June. 1938), 183.
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and appreciate each other's point of view, psychology, and traditions. Such understanding must be the foundation of any wholehearted cooperation and lasting peace.
Another potent factor underlying the clash between Japan and
the United Nations is the western attitude of superiority in dealing
with nations of the Orient. It stems in part from the superior material civilization of the newly industrialized west when the first
modern contacts were made with the isolated Japanese island kingdom. It stems too from the eager adoption by the Japanese of things
western and from the western failure to appreciate the finer things
in Japanese culture. It was this superiority complex which contributed to the flamboyant western imperialism of the late nineteenth century, the arrogance and self-assurance which could make
a Chamberlain say, "I believe that the British race is the greatest
of governing races that the world has even seen;" or a Curzon announce that "the British Empire is under Providence the greatest
instrument for good that the world has seen . . ." 3
Japan bowed to this superior force in the bombardment of Shimonoseki, in the imposition by the west of extraterritoriality and
tariff control, and in the ·action of the Far Eastern Triplice at the
close of the Sino-Japanese War in 1895. She felt most keenly the
discriminatory treatment of her nationals by immigration and land
laws in Australia, Canada, and the United States. As Ambassador
Hanihara pointed out to Secretary of State Hughes in the memorable note of April 10, 1924:
The important question is whether Japan as a nation is or is not
entitled to the proper respect and consideration of other nations.
In other words the Japanese Government ask of the United States
Government simply that proper consideration ordinarily given by
one nation to the self-respect of another, which after all forms the
basis of amicable international intercourse throughout the civilized
world.•

The affront of exclusion aroused bitter feelings in a sensitive nation
and remained a barrier to better understanding.
Japan developed an inferiority complex in the face of this western assumption of superiority. Perhaps Japan was aware that much
of her new civilization was but imitation of the west, just as much
of her older civilization had been an acquisition from China. Perhaps to compensate Japan proclaimed her skill at eclecticism and at
improvement of innovations from overseas. She sought the approbation of the western powers and their acceptance of her as an
equal. In 1935 I remember the eagerness with which one of the most
prominent citizens of Osaka sought my verdict on the relative
3
Quoted in William L. Langer, Diplomacy of imperialism (2 vols., New York,
1935), pp. 92, 93.
• Quoted in A. 'dhitney Griswold, The far eastern policy of the United States,
(New York, 1938), p. 373.
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merits of the Hotel New Osaka and the best hostelries in the United
States. True recognition of equality Japan has never gained. Her
most ambitious attempt failed at the Paris Peace Conference where
the racial equality amendment fell a victim to the obstructionist
tactics of Minister Hughes of Australia and to the fears of President
Wilson as to California's susceptibilities.
The complex has led Japan to self-assertion. In this connection
one might recall the chauvinistic national monuments at Port Arthur site, as the inscriptions loudly proclaim, of the first great
victory of the yellow race over the white in the Far East. The newspapers report that similar national monuments and museums ·are
now to be constructed at Singapore. Japan has imitated the imperialistic west. As victor in the Sino-Japanese War she burdened
China with extraterritoriality in 1896. Later in 1915 she tried to
impose the Twenty-One Demands upon the young Chinese Republic. Or, to cite a more recent instance, her insistence upon naval
parity with Britain and the United States in 1930 was probably
more an ·attempt to satisfy amonr propre than to fill a real n·eed.
It has always been with peculiar pleasure that Japan has been
able to turn the tables on once proud western nations. Witness the
1914 note to Germany on the surrender of Kiaochow. In this the
Japanese used the identical language of the German, French, and
Russian notes to Japan over Port Arthur nineteen years before.
Witness too the blockade of the British Concession in Tientsin in
the summer of 1939 with the discriminatory treatment of British
nationals as they waited in queues under the sweltering north China
sun. It may well be that the long-smoldering resentment at western
pretensions of superiority contributed. to the Japanese decision to
force the issue in 1941. Here if anywhere rests in considerable measure the responsibility of the United Nations for the present war.
Japan is now engaged in a supreme effort to prove to the world her
indisputable right to be classed as an equal to, if not a peer of the
white nations.
Finally, the war originates in the conflicting national policies of
Japan and the United Nations in the Far East and the world at
large. The United Nations hold a considerable stake in the Far East.
They are unwilling to surrender their rich possessions and jealously
guard both raw materials and colonial markets through various
restrictions. At the same time they have insisted upon equality of
opportunity in trade with China. They maintain that their rights
in China were gained by legal means and deserve both protection
and preservation. Yet concern for China has been dictated by
neither philanthropy nor business interests. Fundamentally much
of the diplomacy of the last few decades has been predicated upon
maintaining a free and independent China as a counterweight to
Japan, and as the best assurance of a balance of power in the Orient.
The Pacific powers felt that their safety would be in jeopardy
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should Japan control the immense natural resources and endless
human reserves of China.
There was a larger consideration too. In a burst of idealism the
world had embarked upon a new era in 1919. Force was outlawed.
The League of Nations and the Permanent Court of International
Justice were created as agencies to preserve the peace and to effect
necessary changes in treaty structures. Such instruments as the
Washington Treaties and the Kellogg-Briand Pact were symbolic
of the new international order. They had to be kept inviolate.
Change by force was not to be sanctioned. Stimson's policy of nonrecognition then was more than an attempt to thwart ,Japanese
aims in lVIanchuria; it was an effort to preserve the whole peace
machinery of the world before the new disintegrating forces. The
United Nations felt that Japan's Manchurian venture was but the
- prototype of the aggressions that followed, and upon Japan fell the
onus of the first real breach in the peace.
Japan, on the other hand, has opposed the contentions of the
powers. Citing the doctrine of rebus sic stantibus, she has claimed
that the ·washington Treaties no longer apply to conditions in the
Far East. As one of her great newspapers, the Tokyo Nichi nichi
expressed it, "If the United States under the present-day East Asian
situation, should try to insist upon the Nine-Power pact, she would
be committing, an anachronistic blunder more serious than that of
claiming the Open Door." 5 From Japan's point of view it was her
peculiar mission to maintain the peace and order of East Asia. This
was well stated by Foreign Minister Koki Hirota in the middle
'thirties:
The United States should keep her hands off Far Eastern affairs
and place implicit confidence in Japan's efforts to maintain peace
and order in Asia. The world should be divided into three parts, under the influence of American, European, and Asiatic J\1onroe Doctrines.°

The Japanese expansionists had convinc~d themselves that Japan's future development lay on the continent and that no foreign
interference could be brooked. As an editorial in Kokumin expressed
it, "The China continent is to Japan her life line, and on this national consciousness, Japan is pushing her new order construction."•
Japan's development in the past, they felt, had been thwarted by
the powers. Nichi nichi claimed that the "greatest objective of the
conclusion of the Nine-Power pact has been to check Japan's continental development," and that "the most blunt manifestation of
this sinister move on the part of the United States was the enact, Quoted in the Japan times weekly, III (August 10, 1939), 52!'!.
0
Quoted in Carlos P. Romulo, "The Philippines look at .Japan," Foreiyn affairs,
XIV (April, 1936), 486.,
7
Quoted in Japan times weekly, IV (September !'!8, l!J30). 120.
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ment of the 199l4 anti-Japanese immigration law." s Foreign tariff
barriers and quota restrictions leveled against Japanese manufactures were a further evidence of this determination to obstruct
Japan's growth. Japan seemed to run into interference upon every
side.
The development denied to Japan in the world at large would
· therefore have to be sought in China. A great economic bloc of
Japan, Manchukuo, and China should be created in which the constituent members would contribute harmoniously to the Japanese
ecopomy. To accomplish this China had to be kept weak and pliable. Nothing should be allowed to interfere with this scheme of
continental development. Continued Chinese resistance to Japan
·was therefore blamed upon the western powers. The .Japan thne.s
weekly even went so far as to claim that
it can be proved that had there been no western entanglements in the
politico-military affairs of China before the Sino-Japanese Affair and
during it, the two countries could have achieved an understanding
without resort to arms. The Lytton Commission has been referred to
as a device to keep the .Japanese and Chinese from coming to an
agreemept.0

Loans to China and the furnishing of military supplies were anathema to the Japanese. They were determined to achieve their objective at all costs, and the Tokyo Asahi warned in September, 1939,
that nothing would deter Japan's action, "whether it be British,
French or American influence." 10 ·
Here then was a vital conflict or'interest. On the one hand, the
Un'ited Nations were adopting economic measures against Japan
and insisting upon a strong and independent China. On the other,
Japan felt that her legitimate national growth had· been interfered
with by the immigration restrictions, tariff walls, and quota arrangements of the United Nations. Moreover, her legitimate field
of expansion, the Asiatic mainland, ,vas disputed by the pretentious
powers. Japan felt that she must risk all on the strength of her
arms. To some in the military party China and East Asia were but
a prelude in any event to the greater fields of conquest foretold in
the famous Tanaka Memorial. Japan must be recognized as a vigorous and vital force, a nation on the ascendant. There was no turning back. The time had come to break the power of the British, the
French, the Dutch, and the Americans in the Far East. As General
Araki said in 1939l:
·
The spirit of the Japanese nation is, by its nature, a thing that
must be propagated over the seven seas and extended over the five
continents. Anything that may hinder its progress must be abolished,
even QY force. 11
8

Quoted in Japan times weekly, III (August 10, 1 !)39), 522.
Japan times weekly, VI (June 27, 1940), 298.
10
Quoted in Japan times weekly, IV (September 28, 1939), 119.
11
Quoted in Romulo, Foreign affairs, XIV (April, 1986), 486.
0

